

# Receptivity of Nigerian Print Media Framing of Boko Haram Terrorist Attacks

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## Abstract

The campaign of terror being waged against Nigeria and its residents by the Boko Haram sect has concomitantly attracted elaborate coverage by the Nigerian mass media. The media space granted this terrorist activities has rekindled the ever perennial debate about the association between media coverage and audience reception. This empirical investigation was conducted to determine the relationship between print media coverage of terrorist acts in Nigeria and Federal Capital City, Abuja, residents' reception of these reports. Findings showed that while respondents are cowed by the intensive print media coverage, demographic variables, save for education, did not play any role in this regard. Results further showed that the reportage has, however, not undermined the social and religious routines of the subjects. In all, residents of Abuja did not ascribe the intensified level of terrorist attacks to print media coverage.

**Keywords:** *.Print media .Framing .Boko Haram .Terrorism*

## INTRODUCTION

Mass media and violence have always constituted an explosive mix. A surfeit of theories has dogged the scholarly discussion of the relationship between mass mediated violence and real life social aggression. The postulates of social researchers such as Seymour Feshbach, Leonard Berkowitz, Bandura and Walters, Joseph Klapper as well as Gerbner and associates who hypothesize the catharsis, stimulating effects, observational, reinforcements and cultivation analysis theories (Baran & Davis, 2012) respectively are still considered the most clarifying empirically guided perspectives on the effect of media portrayal of violence on audience behaviour.

The phenomenal upsurge in the incidence of terrorism and the accentuated coverage of terrorists' deadly campaign by the mass media in the last two decades have offered a fresh dimension to the perennial debates on the relationship between the two concepts. While there appears to be some form of consensus that the relationship between the mass media and terrorism is that of interdependence, controversy still rages on which of the two hosts and feeds the other more. That is, does terrorism feed on media coverage or is terrorist activities the life line of modern mass media? For a society that is daily soaked in and frustrated by an avalanche of media reports detailing horrendous and indiscriminate terrorist attacks on innocent civilians, it sounds more plausible to align with the argument that the media platform offered to these terrorists has more than whetted their insatiable thirst for more human blood. This interpretive perspective resonate with Goldstein and Pevehouse (2010) who observed that media coverage of terrorist activities only unwittingly plays into the fundamental philosophy and ultimate objective of terrorism as a modern tactics of political struggle. They aver that terrorism is often a calculated strategy of a weak group' to demoralize a civilian population in order to use its discontent as a leverage on national government or other parties to a conflict'. With their coverage, the mass media only provide a platform for the terrorist agenda to gain salience among the terrorized populace and ultimately pressure the governing authority into conceding to the blackmail of the terrorist. This line of argument also receives the sympathy of Neuwirth (2006) who claims that the media incentivises terrorism by providing a propaganda

bonanza for their bloody attacks; a view that was also amplified by Biernatzki (2002) who excoriated the media for overreacting to the publicity quest of terrorist organisations.

The other side to this debate submit that media feeding frenzy on the carnage by terrorist groups has inadvertently induced more brazen attacks. A media community, it is argued, that is fixated on bottom-line profit will definitely discard all cautions and be blinded by the preoccupation to awe the audience and by so doing gain some respectable viewership or readership. Terrorism, it seems, has become the only life line of a media industry paranoid by the increasing apathy of an audience plagued by limited time but more varied leisure opportunities. The syllogism seems 'the more *shocking* the story and the footage or pictures the more audience it attracts; large audience is a sure bait for marketers.' Jenkins ([www.transnationalterrorism.eu/](http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/)) posited this argument when he asserted that terrorism has many features that hold attraction for the audience and makes it irresistible for the news media.

### **Statement of the Problem**

The Nigerian media, in deference to their constitutional sentry duty, have fed on and reported the anarchist campaign of Boko Haram sect. Media framing of these attacks has been described as fuelling the brazen desire of the group to stage more attacks. To these media critics, media narrative has inadvertently played into the hands of this blood thirsty extremists and help them achieve their ultimate goal of undermining the government and pressuring it to concede grounds to the sect. The newspaper platform of the Nigerian mass media, apparently forced to defend its fast dwindling market, seems more culpable. Casual observations revealed that people in cosmopolitan places like Abuja daily besiege newspaper stands to not only catch glimpse of print media headlines but to also ventilate their views on media agenda of the day. Newspaper content, now also accessible through electronic mobile devices such as Smartphone, i-pads and laptops, indeed shapes the realities of many Nigerians. The general objective of this study therefore was to empirically investigate among residents of Abuja, who by their cosmopolitan nature are not only media receptive but who have also felt the wrath of the Boko Haram terrorist attacks, the impact of newspaper coverage of the sectarian war by Boko Haram. The specific objectives are implicit in the following hypotheses signposting the study.

### **Research Hypotheses**

#### **Hypothesis One**

H<sub>0</sub> Residents of Abuja are not significantly affected by print media reportage of Boko Haram activities.

#### **Hypothesis Two**

H<sub>0</sub> Demographic variables play no role in Abuja residents' response to print media coverage of Boko Haram attacks.

#### **Hypothesis Three**

H<sub>0</sub> The print media framing of domestic terrorism has not affected socio-religious activities in the Federal Capital Territory of Nigeria.

#### **Hypothesis Four**

H<sub>0</sub> Residents of Abuja do not attribute the intensity of domestic terrorism in northern Nigeria to the print media reportage of Boko Haram attacks.

### **Review of Relevant Literature**

Terrorism as a concept, poses a certain degree of challenge mainly because the term itself is often subject to emotional interpretations and colourations. While some argue that one man's terrorist is another's freedom fighter, literature from several scholars point towards the fact that motive and the use of fear constitute significant issues to the interpretation of terrorism. O'Neil (2003) made this point when he quoted Hoffman (1996) as saying, that "Terrorism is a particularly difficult threat to assess." because it often comprises "amorphous associations of highly mobile individuals whose intentions are virtually impossible to gauge.

Ogundiya and Amzat (2008) submit that Nigeria's fragile socio-political system as well as economic and religious context, perfectly fit into the four broad factors which precipitate

terrorist activities: "Political, economic, psychological and socio-cultural discrepancies or grievances among certain group of people in the society." Cremshaw (1981: 383), as cited in Ogundiya and Amzat submit that "the existence of concrete grievances among an identifiable sub-group of a larger population," is the first condition that can be considered a direct cause of terrorism. Thus, the terror group becomes the channel through which these grievances can be addressed or to gain public support.

Obioma (2013) agrees that whether local or international, terrorism is always political even though it may draw upon other ancillary factors such religion, economic or social. He attributes Nigeria's domestic terrorism to the emergence of militant groups that took advantage of the government's "inefficient actions and inactions in dealing with the fundamental elements of our nationhood."

Alozieuwa (2012)'s study gives credence to the multiple factor theory which goes beyond socio-economic issues as the real causes of Nigeria's terrorism. Kukah (2012) as cited in Alozieuwa, says the socio-economic angle to terrorism de-emphasizes the Northern or Muslim factor in Boko Haram's terror attacks. This perspective throws the weight of blame on the human needs factor which believes everyone has basic needs to fulfil and failure to do so would result in conflict.

Okoro (2010) submits that it is globalization hiding under the cloak of religion which propels people towards terrorist acts. According to him, globalization agenda tends to "depersonalize culture, break traditional identities; nullify national sovereignty and violate human rights and life of those at the fringes of development." Consequently, he further posits that victims of this scheme use terrorism as tools of vengeance against the perceived injustice against them. "Religion, on the one hand, occupying a central position in human life, becomes a medium of translating this socio-political conflict into a moral one. His paper concludes with the position that unless globalization ends, terrorism will continue to thrive.

Forest (2012. p.31) holds that at the heart of every terrorist attack, are several interlocking factors such as marginalization and unequal access to opportunity in the society which often play out as religious or political backlash. He argues that the citizens of a state can become easily disenchanted and recourse to violence when "a government fails to adhere to the conventional social contract between government and the governed." In *Mass Media and Terrorism*, Altheide (2009) remarks, "The mass media promotes terrorism by stressing fear and uncertain future." Bilgen, (2012) in *Terrorism and the Media: A dangerous Symbiosis*, states that history has provided ample evidence of the mutually beneficial relationship between terrorist organizations and the media. According to him, this is hardly surprising as the problem does not lie in *why*, but in *how* the media covers terrorism.

He says the fact that the media covers terrorist acts by framing it from a sensational angle as well as repeating the same images over and over again, creates room for traumatizing the audience. In addition, he states that the media traumatizes the audience by exaggerating the threats, or, as it was in the case of US after the memorable terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, showing nonstop footage of combat scenes (Long 2002). Bilgen believes that the media unwittingly serves the terrorists' interest by repeating the shocking images and trying to rationalize their "cause." He sums up his position by stating that the media's bias and seeming obsession of sensationalism, may in fact serve the terrorist cause to "create an atmosphere and politics of fear, and create ripe conditions for propaganda and recruitment following any terrorist attack.

Similarly, Altheide (2009) argues that this politics of fear is a dominant motif for news and popular culture today. Moreover, within this framework, news reporting about terrorism is linked with "victimization" narratives that make crime, danger, and fear very relevant to everyday experiences. Although the surveillance duty of the mass media more than vindicate their proclivities for intelligence gathering-whatever forms it takes, nevertheless restraint would have shielded the society from been jaded by constant exposure to blood. Musa (2012), the Commandant of the Joint Task Force (JTF) mandated to quash the Boko Haram group in Bornu State, commenting on the frequency of media coverage of terrorism remarked that the long term effects "involve dangerous erosion of some moral boundaries and have the potency to be accepted as a bargaining power for negotiation or a justifiable means of political or religious conflict."

Beyond frequency, the slant or framing of the reports can also colour public response or perception of the terrorist group. In *How the Media Enable Terrorism*, [americanthinker.com](http://www.americanthinker.com/) (2006) <http://www.americanthinker.com/>, Neuwirth (2006) say as long as the general public derives its perception of the wider reality through the media, it takes every media report as truth especially when "the major media all sing a similar tune. "She submits that the major media can spin and colour stories to suit their agenda thereby forcing the government to "feel pressured to act in one direction or the other." Ngoa (2012) earlier corroborates this position when he says, "I truth, accuracy and context have become secondary, just as the public's right to know is also now secondary."

The implication of this slant in media reporting or bias is what Usman (2013) refers to as the ability of the terrorists group to manipulate the minds of people to gain sympathy. Responding to claims that the JTF was involved in abuse of innocent civilians while trying to dislodge the Boko Haram terrorists from their hideouts, he said: 'the terrorists are not only concerned about physical violence they also manipulate the minds of people through propaganda and they have a lot of sympathisers'.

Thus far, many scholars and authors have addressed the issue of domestic terrorism from several angles - from the multi-theoretical approach of causative factors of terrorism, to the single-based approach. Even within this broad spectrum, when the media is mentioned, the views have generally centred on the symbiotic relationship between the media and terrorists. The conclusion is often that without "the oxygen of publicity," there will be little or no incentive for terrorism to thrive.

There is a dearth of related literature which focuses on how the public responds to the frequency and framing of these terrorism reports or how these affect the public. It is this gap this research wishes to bridge. This study seeks to find out, among other points; to what extent these factors affect the public's perception of the government as well as its response to socio-religious activities.

### **Theoretical Framework**

This study is underpinned by the media framing theory as originally propounded by Irvin Goffman (1974) Goffman, as rehashed by Baran & Davis (2009), postulated that a frame is needed to organize, much like a Jigsaw Puzzle, fragmented information. It is a way of giving some overall interpretation to isolated items of fact. It is the news angle and the journalist narrative of events using words, context, and footage selectively to achieve an end. The kernel of this theoretical perspective is that media portrayals of every day social reality practically impose blinkers that constrain how the audience interprets these events. That is, the editorial slants, media narrative, textual features, audio-visual materials, are all instrumental to media framing that inexorably condition audience interpretation. From the tenor of this theory, the audience is powerless as it is pitted against an overpowering media force and its viewpoint is shaped by media narrative.

### **Research Design**

The study utilized a descriptive survey design and was executed in Abuja, the federal capital of Nigeria. Abuja comprises six local government- Abuja municipal (16 wards), Kuje (11 wards), Gwagwalada (10 wards), Abaji (10 wards), Kwali (10), and Bwari (10). The 2006 census exercise puts its population at 776,298 people. Through the use of multi-stage sampling technique, the study was based on a sample size of 750 respondents. Questionnaire, which was designed and tested for validity and reliability, was the data gathering instrument. Copies of the instrument were administered by trained research assistants. The field exercise as well as subsequent data cleaning operations revealed a return rate of 75.5%. That is, of the 750 copies administered, 699 copies were retrieved, but only 566 were processed. Data presentation and analyses of casual relationship were done using tables, correlation and regression matrix.

## Data Analysis and Discussion of Findings

**Table 1:** Demographic Profile of Respondents.

Variable	Category	Fx	%	Valid	Cumulative %
Gender	Male	332	58.7	58.7	58.7
	Female	234	41.3	41.3	100.0
Age	18-27 years	162	28.6	28.6	28.6
	28-37 years	203	35.9	35.9	64.5
	38-47 years	130	23.0	23.0	87.5
	48-57 years	59	10.4	10.4	97.9
	Above 58 years	12	2.1	2.1	100.0
Educational Qualification	Primary	8	1.4	1.4	1.4
	Secondary	56	9.9	9.9	11.3
	Tertiary (HND)	137	24.2	24.2	35.5
	University	201	35.5	35.5	71.0
	Post Graduate	164	29.0	29.0	100.0
Employment	Self-employed	131	23.1	23.1	23.1
	Government-Employed	252	44.5	44.5	67.6
	Unemployed	114	20.1	20.1	87.7
	Private	18	3.2	3.2	90.9
	Others	51	9.0	9.0	99.9
Ethnic Group	Biom	6	1.1	1.1	1.1
	Edo	38	6.7	6.7	7.8
	Hausa	59	10.4	10.4	18.2
	Igbo	131	23.1	23.1	41.3
	Itsekiri	1	.2	.2	41.5
	Kanuri	7	1.2	1.2	42.7
	Urhobo	6	1.1	1.1	43.8
	Yoruba	88	15.5	15.5	59.4
	Others	226	39.9	39.9	99.3
	Ijaw	4	8	8	100.0
Religious	Christain	434	76.7	76.7	76.7
	Muslim	119	21.0	21.0	97.7
	African Traditional Religion	6	1.1	1.1	98.8
	Others	7	1.2	1.2	100.0
	<b>Respondents</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>566</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

### Demographic Characteristics

The respondents cut across different socio-economic and educational strata with the gender distribution between male and female at 58.7% male and 41.3% female. While there appears to be more Christians (76.7%) than Muslims (21%), no deliberate attempt was made to pick respondents along religious lines. Similarly, the highest number of respondents falls within the 28 - 37 age bracket accounting for 35.9% as opposed to those with 2.1% within the age bracket of 58 and above. Graduates with first degrees make up 35.5% of the respondents while post graduates and HND holders make up 29%, and 24.2% respectively. The least educational qualification of primary level, constitute just 1.4% as opposed to the secondary school education certificate holders who made up 9.9% of the respondents. In terms of employment statues, expectedly civil servants (government employed) top the list with 45.5% while the unemployed recorded 20.1%. Self-employed had 23.1% showing. For ethnic group, behind the 'other' category, which captured other ethnic groups that could not be separately individually categorized, calibrated, and pulled the highest percent with 39.9%, the Igbo ethnic group recorded 23.1%, followed by the Yoruba which pulled a distant 15.5%. The Hausa recorded a 10.4% showing while the others had modest single digit appearance. In the area of religious affiliation, the Christians recorded the largest representation with overwhelming 76.7%, the Muslims had 21% while adherents of the African Traditional Religion pulled 1.1%.

**H<sub>0</sub>:** Residents of Abuja are not significantly affected by print media coverage of Boko Haram activities.

Table 2: standard deviation of Respondents attitude and media coverage of Boko Haram

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
I feel threatened by print media reports of terrorism.	566	1:00	5:00	3.417	1.32076

Since Chi-Square is testing the null hypothesis, the Sig value must be **.05 or less** for there to be a significant statistical support for the relationship between the variables. In this case, the standard deviation of 1.32076 is higher than 0.5 which does not support the null hypothesis. A rejected null hypothesis means that the public is significantly affected and feels threatened by the print media reportage of Boko Haram attacks.

Table 3: Chi- square test of Hypothesis one.

Pearson Chi-Square	51.010(a)	12	.000
Likelihood Ratio	41.710	12	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	11.558	1	.001
N of Valid Cases	563		

A 4 cells (20%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .96. The above result shows a strong level of significance between the frequency of publicity given to terror attacks by Boko Haram in the print media and the public’s fear of threat. Since Chi-Square is testing the null hypothesis, the Sig value must be **.05 or less** for there to be a significant statistical support for the relationship between the variables. The chi-square result here is .001. This confirms a strong level of significance. The null hypothesis that the public is not affected by the frequency of the terrorism reports in the print media is thus rejected.

**H<sub>0</sub>** Demographic variables play no role in public response to print media coverage of Boko Haram attacks.

The demographic factors tested were: **gender, age, educational attainment, employment status, state, ethnicity and religion.**

Table 4:

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	4.464 <sup>a</sup>	4	.347
Likelihood Ratio	4.457	4	.348
Linear-by-Linear Association	.753	1	.385
N of Valid Cases	566		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.58.

The chi-square  $\chi^2$  test yielded a p-value of .347. This value suggests that no significant difference exists between the number of male and female respondents who feel threatened by media reports.

This supports the null hypothesis that gender does not play a role in the way the public responds to print media report of terrorism.

**TABLE 5 Chi-Square Tests for Age dimension of Hypothesis two**

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	19.563(a)	16	.241
Likelihood Ratio	19.008	16	.268
Linear-by-Linear Association	5.740	1	.017
N of Valid Cases	566		

The chi-square  $\chi^2$  test yielded a p-value of .241. This value of chi-square which is more than 0.05, establishes no significance between age and threat of print media reports. This accepts the null hypothesis that age plays no role in the respondent's feeling of threat towards media reports of terrorism.

- i. To test if educational attainment affects public response to print media coverage of Boko Haram attacks

**TABLE 6 Chi-Square Tests for education dimension of Hypothesis two**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	25.150(a)	16	.067
Likelihood Ratio	25.652	16	.059
Linear-by-Linear Association	7.804	1	.005
N of Valid Cases	566		

a 6 cells (24.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .40.

The chi-square  $\chi^2$  test yielded a p-value of .067 which is just slightly higher than the .05 or 5% significance. This value suggests a weak level of significance between educational attainment and the respondents who feel threatened by print media reports. The null hypothesis that states that there is no significance between the educational attainment and the feeling of threat by print media reports of Boko Haram attacks is accepted.

**Table 7: Chi-Square Tests for employment dimension of Hypothesis two.**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	13.304(a)	16	.650
Likelihood Ratio	13.714	16	.620
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.729	1	.189
N of Valid Cases	566		

a 5 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .89.

The chi-square  $\chi^2$  test which yielded a p-value of .650 shows no strong significance between employment status and the way the public responds to the print media reportage of Boko

Haram attacks. The null hypothesis that employment status does not affect public response to terrorism reports in the print media is accepted.

**Table 8 Chi-Square Tests for ethnic dimension of Hypothesis two.**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	47.456(a)	36	.096
Likelihood Ratio	44.753	36	.150
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.827	1	.176
N of Valid Cases	566		

a 29 cells (58.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .05. Consistent with the preceding demographic influence on the dependent variable, the Chi-square result of .096 shows there is no strong significance and accepts the null hypothesis that ethnicity is not a significant factor in the public’s feeling of threat by the print media’s response to Boko Haram attacks.

To test if religion affects public response to print media coverage of Boko Haram attacks.

**Table 9: Chi-Square Tests for religious affiliation dimension of Hypothesis two.**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	22.443(a)	12	.033
Likelihood Ratio	23.182	12	.026
Linear-by-Linear Association	4.160	1	.041
N of Valid Cases	566		

a 10 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .30.

In all, although all the tested religions collectively acting as predictor variable, indicated that a higher percentage of respondents feel more threatened, the Christian respondents whose members in Northern Nigeria had constituted prime targets of these terrorist attacks paradoxically recorded the lowest among the four discrete variable of religion. The Chi-square result  $\chi^2$  test yielded a p-value of .033 which shows there is a strong significance between religion and the public’s emotion of threat by print media report of Boko Haram attacks, thus rejecting the null hypothesis that religion is not a factor.

**H<sub>3</sub>** the print media framing of domestic terrorism has not affected socio-religious activities in the Federal Capital Territory of Nigeria.

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi- Square	1.697 <sup>a</sup>	4	.791
Likelihood Ratio	1.710	4	.789
Linear-by-Linear Association	.036	1	.851
N of Valid Cases	566		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.92.

The Chi-square result of 0.791 thus shows a weak significance on the influence of print media reportage of Boko Haram attacks on attendance of places of worship. The null hypothesis that framing of print media reports of Boko Haram attacks does not significantly affect attendance of worship is accepted.

Table 11: **Chi-Square Tests** : For Gender & attendance of social events.

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	4.062 <sup>a</sup>	4	.398
Likelihood Ratio	4.249	4	.373
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.303	1	.254
N of Valid Cases	566		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.68.

The Chi-square result with a p-value of .396 establishes no strong significant difference between genders on the influence of print media reports on attendance of social events. Even so, it rejects the null hypothesis which posits that print media report does not affect public attendance of social events in the FCT. From the above findings, one can safely assume that print media reports of Boko Haram attacks affects attendance of social events than religious places of worship.

H<sub>0</sub> Residents of Abuja do not attribute the intensity of domestic terrorism in northern Nigeria to the print media reportage of Boko Haram attacks.

Table 12: Relationship between perception and attribution of terrorism

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2.268 <sup>a</sup>	4	.687
Likelihood Ratio	2.257	4	.689
Linear-by-Linear Association	.207	1	.649
N of Valid Cases	566		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 19.84.

The chi-square  $\chi^2$  test with a p-value of 0.687 suggests no strong significant difference exists between the number of males and of females who attribute the intensity of Boko Haram attacks in Northern Nigeria to print media reports. This accepts the null hypothesis that the public does not attribute the level of terrorism attacks to media coverage of Boko Haram activities.

It is however notable that while this research finding upholds that the public understands the meaning of the word terrorism as well as admits to an awareness of increase in the level of terrorism in Nigeria, as reflected in the tables, it still posits that besides the print media publicity of terrorism, the respondents allude to other stronger causative factors for the level of Boko Haram attacks in northern Nigeria.

**Conclusion and Recommendations**

In the light of the findings, the study concluded that even though the public does not believe that the Nigerian print media is culpable in the increasing mindless attacks by the Boko Haram sect, the Nigeria media framing of the Boko Haram bellicose campaign has foisted a climate of

fear on Abuja, the capital of Nigeria. Although this atmosphere of fear appeared insufficient to deter residents from their normal social and religious activities, it affected their perception of the government. While the researchers could not determine whether the Nigerian press coverage of the terrorist activities were deliberately framed to create that atmosphere of fear, the media, in deference to its social responsibility expectations, can mitigate its narrative. Against this background, it is recommended that a training centre for intelligence and counter-terrorism reporting be established to hone the reporting skills of Nigerian journalists in this sensitive area. The Nigerian military is also admonished to widen reporters' access to information using techniques such as embedding, infiltration and participant observation to enhance quality coverage.

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