

Securing us through the Airwaves: Analysis of the Influence of Broadcast Media Security Awareness Campaigns on Security Alertness among Enugu State Residents

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Abstract

For some time now, peace has remained elusive in different parts of the world. From Mali to Egypt, to Kenya, to Somalia, to Syria, to Pakistan, to Nigeria; the story is the same. The situation in Nigeria is particularly enmeshed such that a country which cannot boast of factories to cater for her teeming unemployed graduates, now has bomb manufacturing factories deployed against the citizens by anarchists/terrorists. The Nigerian broadcast media in a swift response have carried out different campaigns with a view to stemming the tide of insecurity in the country. This is the issue examined in this study. The paper takes off with the aim of ascertaining the relationship between broadcast media campaigns and audience security alertness; the extent of the relationship as well as factors that enhance audience understanding of these campaign messages. Using a survey design, stratified sampling was adopted and 400 respondents sampled in four local government areas of Enugu State, Nigeria. Within the frame work of a trilogy of social responsibility, agenda setting and information processing theories, findings suggest significant relationship between broadcast media campaigns and audience security alertness. Findings also revealed that the relationship though significant, is weak, while factors that enhance audience understanding of broadcast security awareness campaigns are; frequency, simplicity of language, richness of content and persuasiveness. The paper argues that following the perceived ineffectiveness of security intelligence among security agencies in Nigeria, the broadcast media should deploy its immediacy strength with a view to implanting a sense of security alertness among Nigerians as a deliberate way of addressing the security intelligence. Based on this argument therefore, the paper recommends among others; the enactment of an act of parliament, mandating broadcast media stations in Nigeria to give top priority to security awareness campaigns in their programming.

Key words: .Exposure .Broadcast Media . Security .Alertness .Campaigns

Introduction

Nigeria today is faced with many security challenges ranging from kidnapping to terrorism, to robbery, to rape among others. The Nigeria broadcast media in a bid to live up to its social responsibility have responded with security awareness campaigns; all in an effort to implant a sense of security alertness to Nigerians; thereby preparing them to join in the war against insecurity. For example, the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN) with its slogan of; "Up Lifting the People and Uniting the Nation" has designed a programme known as "Watch 360" which comes up on its Network Service at 5:30 pm every Sunday. It is a security awareness programme which attempts to inject the spirit of security consciousness in Nigerians. Other security alertness messages from FRCN which normally come up during prime time like before Nationwide News or in between are; "the effectiveness of our security agencies depend on our cooperation, provide them with useful information to enable them perform their duties and be vigilant, report suspicious object and persons to the police". Pidgin language is equally used to ensure that audience members who are not highly educated also understand - "Nigeria awa countri mek we helep Nigeria beta." Mobile phones numbers are also provided to the public to enable them raise alarm, where need be. The numbers as made available by FRCN are 07057274630 or 07057274632; while the number for short messages is 20544. The Nigeria

Television Authority (NTA) is not left out in the effort of security awareness campaigns. For example, NTAL, (NTA International) an affiliate of NTA on the 9th of September, 2013 during its programme "Nigeria Today" focused on the topic "Promoting Security Consciousness in our Neighbourhood". The instances are numerous. All geared towards promoting security alertness among the Nigeria public and in turn, combating the current poor security situation in the country. However, how far these efforts are yielding positive result is what necessitated this study.

Statement of the Problem

For some time now, Nigeria has been going through security challenges which has claimed many innocent lives and destroyed properties worth millions, thereby bringing economic activities in certain parts of the country to a standstill. Efforts by security operatives to restore normalcy in the country have met with daunting challenges as cases of attacks and counter attacks continue to make *banner headlines* in our national dailies and occupy the air waves of our broadcast media.

The broadcast media in Nigeria, as part of its social responsibility, have responded swiftly by embarking on different security alertness campaigns. These campaigns, no doubt are aimed at implanting a sense of security alertness to Nigerians with a view to addressing the security challenges.

However, it is not clear how far these efforts have yielded dividends as regards security alertness. A corollary to that is to provide empirical evidence on the factors that enhance or detract the audience from understanding broadcast media security awareness campaigns.

Research Questions

This study seeks answers to the following questions

1. What is the relationship between broadcast media security awareness campaigns and audience security alertness?
2. To what extent do broadcast media campaigns enhance audience security alertness?
3. What are the factors that detract from and those that enhance audience understanding of security awareness campaigns?

Literature Review

The Concept of Broadcast Campaigns and Security Alertness

The current porous security arrangement in the country calls for intensified and sustainable campaigns by the broadcast media. Broadcast media campaigns are strategically planned and executed to change audience attitudes. Sandman in Day and Monroe (2000, p.80), posits that campaigns are designed to increase awareness, inform or change behaviour in target audience. It is expected that when the broadcast media intensify campaign on security related issues, it will lead to security alertness. Security alertness means being alive to our security. The Emotional Intelligence Institute (2013), notes that alertness is a valuable tool that can resourcefully help us to navigate our mind better. If there is any weapon that Nigerians need now, it is security alertness because other options have failed. *The Nation* newspaper in its editorial of 1st August, 2013 corroboratively posits; "at no time can we afford a lull in security alertness in any part of the country because the war on terror cannot be over until the extremists are completely subdued". What is required of the Nigeria publics is to be alive to their security; there is no room for complacency.

Nigeria's Security Challenge: 2009-2013

Nigeria as a nation has gone through a myriad of security challenges, including a civil war, between 1967-1970. These security imbalances span across, kidnapping, political turmoil, robbery, terrorism while some crises are believed to have religious undertone. Adaliku (2013,p.2) opines that some of the security challenges facing Nigeria include; trafficking, socio-economic agitations and riots ethno-religious crises, ethnic militias, boundary disputes, cultism, as well as terrorism .Today, Borno which goes with the appellation of "Home of Peace" has become "Home of pieces". Kaduna, the "LiberalState" has lost it liberty, Plateau, the Home of Peace and Tourism is no longer a tourist attraction while Kano, the Centre of Commerce has its

commercial activities truncated. The same thing is applicable to Yobe; which once prided itself as "The Young Shall Grow," but the young ones are now been killed every now and then. What about Benue, 'The Food Basket of the Nation?' The food basket is gradually becoming empty as a result of serial attacks on Benue farmers by men suspected to be Fulani herdsmen. The situation is really complex. On the role of the media in addressing this problem, Ejike, Okoro and Sheba (n. d) write:

The present circumstance in Nigeria in which we are increasingly witnessing a new trend of social disorder and unrest orchestrated by the incessant terrorist attacks, bombings, armed robbery and social vices as well as the potential of this status quo to undermine social economic development of the nation, the repositioning and efficiency of the Nigeria media becomes imperative.

However, the current security quagmire characterised by bombing of public places is believed by many to have started in 2009. One of the deadliest attacks of that year as reported by Aljazeera (2009) reads "...The reporter later counted 50 bodies inside the building and another 50 in the courtyard outside" The *Vanguard* (2009) captures "Leader of Boko Haram, the Islamic sect blamed for days of deadly violence in Nigeria has been killed, his followers have been blamed for violence in the North that has left more than 300 people dead". That was as far back as 2009 when the sect's attacks killed 300 persons.

After the killing of the sect's leader, Yusuf Mohammed, it was expected that the bombings would stop but that was not the case as the trend continued alongside other security threats like kidnapping, armed robbery, etc. The 50th independence anniversary was marred by bomb blasts. This, The Guardian captures: "At least, eight people killed by militants" The Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta claimed responsibility over what they called 50 years of failure. That blast was just one in the series of bomb blasts that took place that year. Of course, that year was not free from other insecurity threats like armed robbery, etc.

The hope of having a secure country was further made complex as the insecurity extended to 2011. For example, the United Nations building was on 26 August, 2011 attacked. This time, Boko Haram claimed responsibility and gave reasons for its action as captured by the *Vanguard* thus "Yusufiyya Movement, also known as Boko Haram yesterday said it attacked the United Nations (UN) building in Abuja because United States (US) and the UN are supporting the Federal Government to persecute Muslims in Nigeria".

With the attack on the UN building in Abuja, the security challenge in the country assumed a worsening dimension. The following year witnessed another series of bomb blasts. Some of the attacks as documented by Wikipedia free encyclopaedia are:

| | |
|------------------|--|
| 7 September 2010 | Bauchi prison break |
| 31 December 2010 | December 2010 Abuja attack |
| 12 March 2011 | Assassinated Muslim Cleric Imam Ibrahim Ahmed Abdullahi for criticizing the violent groups in northeast Nigeria. |
| 22 April 2011 | Boko Haram frees 14 prisoners during a jailbreak in Yola, Adamawa State |
| 29 May 2011 | May 2011 northern Nigeria bombings |
| 16 June 2011 | The group claims responsibility for the 2011 Abuja police headquarters bombing |
| 26 June 2011 | Bombing attack on a beer garden in Maiduguri , leaving 25 dead and 12 injured |
| 10 July 2011 | Bombing at the AllChristianFellowshipChurch in Suleja , Niger State |
| 11 July 2011 | The University of Maiduguri temporarily closes down its campus citing security concerns |
| 12 August 2011 | Prominent Muslim Cleric Liman Bana is shot dead by Boko Haram |

| | |
|-------------------|---|
| 26 August 2011 | 2011 Abuja bombing |
| 4 November 2011 | 2011 Damaturu attacks |
| 25 December 2011 | December 2011 Nigeria bombings! |
| 5-6 January 2012 | January 2012 Nigeria attacks |
| 20 January 2012 | January 2012 Kano bombings |
| 28 January 2012 | Nigerian army says it killed 11 Boko Haram insurgents |
| 8 February 2012 | Boko Haram claims responsibility for a suicide bombing at the army headquarters in Kaduna. |
| 16 February 2012 | Another prison break staged in central Nigeria; 119 prisoners are released, one warden killed. |
| 8 March 2012 | During a British hostage rescue attempt to free Italian engineer Franco Lamolinara and Briton Christopher McManus, abducted in 2011 by a splinter group Boko Haram, both hostages were killed. |
| 31 May 2012 | During a Joint Task Force raid on a Boko Haram den, it was reported that 5 sect members and a German hostage were killed. |
| 3 June 2012 | 15 church-goers were killed and several injured in a church bombing in Bauchi state. Boko Haram claimed responsibility through spokesperson Abu Qaqa. |
| 17 June 2012 | Suicide bombers strike three churches in Kaduna State . At least 50 people were killed. |
| 17 June 2012 | 130 bodies were found in Plateau State. It is presumed they were killed by Boko Haram members. |
| 18 September 2012 | Family of four murdered |
| 18 September 2012 | Murder of six at an outdoor party |
| 19 September 2012 | Nigerian Military arrest Boko Haram members, reported death of Abu Qaqa |
| 3 October 2012 | Around 25-46 people were massacred in the town of Mubi in Nigeria during a night-time raid. |
| 18 March 2013 | 2013 Kano Bus bombing : At least 22 killed and 65 injured, when a suicide car bomb exploded in Kano bus station. |
| 7 May 2013 | At least 55 killed and 105 inmates freed in coordinated attacks on army barracks, a prison and police post in Bama town. |
| 6 July 2013 | Yobe State school shooting : 42 people, mostly students, were killed in a school attack in northeast Nigeria. |
| 29 September 2013 | College of Agriculture in Gujba : 40 male students killed . |
| 14 January 2014 | At least 31 people killed, over 50 people injured by suicide bombing in Maiduguri, Borno State. |
| 16 February 2014 | Izghe massacre: 106 villagers are killed. |
| 25 February 2014 | Federal Government College attack : Fury at military over Yobe deaths. At least 29 teenage boys dead at Federal Government College Buni Yadi. |
| 14 April 2014 | 2014 Chibok kidnapping : Government properties, including the only girls' secondary school, attacked. At least 16 killed or missing, and 234 female students kidnapped. The Boko Harām militants said it would treat them as slaves as part of the "war booty". |
| 14 April 2014 | April 2014 Abuja bombing : Two bombs explode at a crowded bus station in Abuja, Nigeria, killing at least 90 people and injuring more than 200. |
| 5 May 2014 | 2014 Gamburu attack : Boko Haram attacked the twin towns of Gamboru and Ngala in Borno State, Nigeria. They started shooting in a busy marketplace, set houses on fire, and gunned down anyone who |

| | |
|-------------|---|
| | tried to flee. The death toll of the massacre has been set as high as 336. |
| 15 May 2014 | Menari, Tsangayari and Garawa: Boko Haram attacked three villages, killing 60 people. Vigilantes fought back, killing 200 Boko Haram fighters. |
| 17 May 2014 | Paris summit: A summit in Paris has declared Boko Haram is part of al-Qaeda as leaders from West African nations resolved to mount a region-wide offensive against the group that is holding more than 200 schoolgirls hostage in a dense jungle. Western nations have pledged to provide technical expertise and training to the new regional African effort against the Islamic extremists. |
| 18 May 2014 | Kano: Suicide car bomb kills five people. |
| 20 May 2014 | Jos: Twin bomb explosions kill 118 people. |

The information above reveals the precarious security nature of Nigeria from 2011. The situation has continued with the number of casualties on the increase. *The Nation* newspaper in its editorial of August 1st, 2013 entitled '*No Room for Complacency: Kano bombings, an indication that the terror war is far from over*', expressed the worry that terrorists were improving in their strategies as frequent as possible. It reads in part:

.. increasing successes of the security agencies in containing the Boko Haram menace will, therefore, breed fresh challenges of its own that the authorities must be ready to tackle by continuing to fine-tune their anti-terror strategies in accordance with changing situation.....The recent arrest of 42 Boko Haram in Lagos and Ogun States adds to the dangerous dimension of the saga of terrorism in the country. It is an indication that the sect plans to extend its destructive activities so far limited to the north, to other parts of the country.

One of the security threats of 2013 apart from bombing is the killing of over 46 police men and ten State Security Service (SSS) operatives in Nassarawa State. The *Verbatim* (2013,p.8) magazine captures the event thus:

Alakio is no longer a strange name in Nigeria. Many will remember that it is the place 46 police officers and 10 operatives of the State Security Service, SSS, perished under unclear circumstances on may 7. Eight Toyota Hilux vehicles which the security agencies used for the operation were burnt and rendered unusable.

The above is just an excerpt of what happened in Alakio, in NassarawaState. It was another in the series of the security threats facing Nigeria as a nation. Public places like banks, hospitals, libraries among others now subject visitors to embarrassing examination before allowing them access while hand bags and brief cases are no longer acceptable to such premises. It is not an overstatement to say there is a feeling of mutual distrust among Nigerians because some persons even clad in military camouflage to perpetrate evil.

Theoretical Foundation

Three theories were considered appropriate for this study, thus applied. They are Social Responsibility, the Agenda Setting and Information Processing theories.

The social responsibility theory is a product of the Hutchins Commission of 1947. The theory according to Asemah (2011,P.147) holds that the mass media (broadcast in this case) are under obligation to cover all aspects of the society and report to the public. By this theory, the broadcast media are duty bound to create security awareness in the interest of security of the nation.

Agenda-setting theory posits that the media; most especially the news media, dictate what issues (agenda) to be considered most important by the society. The theory was proposed by Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw in 1972/1973 (Asamah 2011,P. 176). Folarin (1998,P.68) remarks that the Agenda-setting theory implies that the media

predetermine what issues to think about. The scholar adds that the media do this through factors like; frequency of reporting, prominence given to the reports through headline display, pictures and layout in newspapers, magazines, films, graphics or timing on radio and television. Also, the degree of conflict generated in the reports and cumulative media specific effects over time. This means, the media (broadcast) have the potential of, through its programming, setting agenda for Nigerians on the current security challenge.

Similarly, the Information Processing Theory according to Asemah (2011,P. 205) posits that attitude change in an individual goes through six stages and that every stage is important. The stages are:

- a. Persuasive message must be communicated. The communicator must package and send a message that will influence attitude, and in this case, security alertness.
- b. The receiver will attend to the message: When a message is persuasive, it attracts the attention of the receiver. The audience must therefore be exposed to security awareness campaigns.
- c. The receiver will comprehend the message: The individual has to fully understand the message. This means the security awareness message must be understood.
- d. The receiver will respond to and is convinced by the argument so exposed to.
- e. The new adopted position is retained, and in this case security alertness.
- f. The desired behavior takes place which in this case is being security conscious; that is security alertness.

Methodology

The research design for this study was survey. Survey was applied because the nature of the study calls for the need to solicit people's opinion which is the hallmark of survey. The instruments of data collection were the questionnaire and interviews. The questionnaire copies were administered to the respondents through the aid of research assistants who were duly trained. Interview sessions were held with randomly selected people. The aim was to broaden the scope of the study.

Population of the Study

The population consists of registered voters in Enugu State. The population of the registered voters in Enugu is placed at 1,358,090. (one million, three hundred and fifty eight thousand and ninety) Nigeriandaily.com. Result of the 2006 census was not used because the researchers felt it was far from the study period hence the use of 2011 voter register.

Sampling

From the population of 1,358,090, a sample size of 400 was drawn at 0.05 using Taro Yamani Formula. Simple random sampling was used to select two local government areas from each senatorial zone. Since Enugu State has three senatorial zones, it therefore means that six LGAs were selected. From these six LGAs, six communities and 400 households were selected.

Copies of questionnaire were consequently distributed. This was complemented with an interview held.

Chi-Square Test of Relationship

In a study such as this where two attributes are involved (direct variables) that form a contingency table, it is always appropriate to examine the existence or non-existence of association or relationship or dependency between these attributes. This is done by the use of Pearson Chi-square statistic, expressed as:

$$\chi^2 = \sum_{i=1}^r \sum_{j=1}^c \frac{(O_{ij} - E_{ij})^2}{e_{ij}} \quad \text{equation (1)}$$

Equation (1) can be simplified to obtain

$$\chi^2 = \sum_{i=1}^r \sum_{j=1}^c \frac{O_{ij}^2}{E_{ij}} - N \quad \text{equation (2)}$$

Where O_{ij} and E_{ij} are the observed and expected frequencies, respectively, of attribute in row i and column j ; r and c are the number of rows and columns respectively and N is the overall total of frequencies.

Coefficient of Contingency (C)

Following the existence of relationship between the attributes in a contingency table, there exists the need to determine the degree of the relationship or association or dependency between the attributes of interest. To achieve this, the coefficient of contingency which is a measure of degree of this relationship is the appropriate statistical tool. This is estimated by the equation express below

$$c \sqrt{\frac{\chi^2}{\chi^2 + N}} \quad \text{equation (3)}$$

Where χ^2 = Chi-square statistic estimated by equation (1) or (2) and N is as defined earlier. In analysis of factors that enhance audience understanding of broadcast media security awareness campaigns, Likert five-points scale was used. This is a psychometric scale usually used to elicit reactions from respondents ranging from strongly agree (SA-5), Agree (A-4), Undecided (U-3), Strongly Disagree (SD-2), Disagree (D-1) accordingly. Hence it is a five-point scale, the benchmark for accepting or rejecting a statement was 3.0.

That is $\frac{15}{3} = 3$. Where $15 = 5+4+3+2+1$

Data Analysis and Result

This part of the paper centres on the test of existence of relationship between exposure to broadcast media security awareness campaigns and audience security alertness. The empirical analyses for this paper were done with the use of *SPSS 16.0*. First, the researchers calculate the response rate thus:

$$\begin{aligned} r &= \frac{\text{total number of responded questionnaire}}{\text{total number of questionnaire}} * 100\% \\ &= \frac{372}{400} * 100\% = 93\% \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the response rate for this study is 93%. The researchers deemed this significant for analysis as the non-returned rate is too meager to affect the result of the study.

Table II: Audience security alertness and exposure to media security campaigns Cross tabulation.

| | | Exposure to media security campaigns | | Total |
|-----------------------------|---|--------------------------------------|--------|--------|
| | | Yes | No | |
| Audience security alertness | Yes Count | 277 | 33 | 310 |
| | Expected Count | 258.3 | 51.7 | 310.0 |
| | % within audience security alertness | 89.4% | 10.6% | 100.0% |
| | % within exposure to media security campaigns | 89.4% | 53.2% | 83.3% |
| | % of Total | 74.5% | 8.9% | 83.3% |
| | Std. Residual | 1.2 | -2.6 | |
| No | Count | 33 | 29 | 62 |
| | Expected Count | 51.7 | 10.3 | 62.0 |
| | % within audience security alertness | 53.2% | 46.8% | 100.0% |
| | % within exposure to media security campaigns | 10.6% | 46.8% | 16.7% |
| | % of Total | 8.9% | 7.8% | 16.7% |
| | Std. Residual | -2.6 | 5.8 | |
| Total | Count | 310 | 62 | 372 |
| | Expected Count | 310.0 | 62.0 | 372.0 |
| | % within audience security alertness | 83.3% | 16.7% | 100.0% |
| | % within exposure to media security campaigns | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| | % of Total | 83.3% | 16.7% | 100.0% |

Source: field survey, 2013

The above cross tabulation yields Chi-square statistic value of 48.557 and critical value; 3.841 at 1 degree of freedom. And hence the statistic is greater than the critical value, it indicates significant relationship between exposure to broadcast media security awareness campaigns and audience security alertness. The degree of this influence is further ascertained using co efficient of contingency as discussed in the methodology.

Coefficient of Contingency (C)

A total of 277 respondents were found to have been exposed to broadcast media security awareness campaigns and at the same time possessed security alertness as shown in table II. The extent of this relationship is further examined using contingency of coefficient as a statistical tool below;

$$C = \sqrt{\frac{48.557}{48.557+277}} = 0.386 \text{ (see methodology for equation 3)}$$

The measurement above shows low but significant degree of influence of the broadcast media on the security alertness of audience as 0.386 can be interpreted as 38.6 percent (0.386 x 100% = 38.6%). To further determine the factors that enhance the understanding

of the broadcast media security awareness campaign messages , Likert five-points scale came handy as shown in the table below;

Table III: *Factors that enhance audience understanding of broadcast security awareness campaigns*

| Scale Factors | Strongly Agree(SA) | Agree (A) | Undecided (U) | Strongly Disagree (SD) | Disagree (D) | \bar{X} | Decision |
|------------------------|--------------------|-----------|---------------|------------------------|--------------|-----------------|----------|
| Frequency | 106 | 147 | 14 | 6 | 4 | 4.2 | Accepted |
| Time aired | 16 | 15 | 22 | 116 | 108 | 1.9 \approx 2 | Rejected |
| Richness of content | 119 | 127 | 12 | 9 | 10 | 4.2 | Accepted |
| Persuasiveness | 131 | 104 | 17 | 9 | 10 | 4.1 | Accepted |
| Simplicity of language | 113 | 141 | 13 | 6 | 4 | 4.2 | Accepted |

Source: field survey,2013

Four of the five items presented in the above table were accepted as factors that enhance audience understanding of broadcast media security awareness campaigns. The audience rejected that the time of airing broadcast media security awareness campaigns programme does enhance their understanding of such messages.

Discussion of Findings

The result of this study suggests that broadcast media security awareness campaigns have a positive effect on those who are exposed to it (see table II). To complement the questionnaire, interview sessions were held with selected audience members. In a question; “Does your exposure to broadcast security awareness campaign influence your security alertness”? Eight of the ten interviewees answered in the affirmative, thus corroborating the result obtained from the questionnaire. The result justifies the paradigm shift in fighting terrorism in which case, civilians and neighbourhood watch groups are now helping in the fight thus leading to what is known as civilian “JTF”. For example, ‘TheNation’ newspaper of Thursday 1st August, 2013 carried a story with a banner headline on its cover page; *Boko Haram: Ohanaeze to fight with civilian JTF*. With a rider ‘stopshedding Igbo blood.’ But in the past, civilians were scared of the terrorist group. From this result, one can infer that the courage of the people to complement security operatives is directly related to broadcast media security awareness campaigns. This result also establishes a link with the one obtained by Yates (2001). Yates documents that media literacy level enhances attitude change. Therefore, it can be said that if the audience do not understand broadcast media security awareness campaigns, security alertness will not be achieved.

However, the extent broadcast media campaign enhance security alertness is weak. This is evident in the 0.386 coefficient of contingency interpreted as 38.6% which is obviously low. This gives credence to the belief that media alone cannot change attitude but that interpersonal communication is more effective. This is evidenced in the study conducted by Gever (2012) in which interpersonal communication was found to be influencing attitude to a large extent. The result of this study is also consistent with that of Dowler (2003).

Findings also suggest that factors enhancing audience understanding of broadcast media campaigns are; frequency of such campaigns, simplicity of language, time aired, richness of content and persuasiveness. Also, during interview session, the interviewees were asked to rate factors that enhance their understanding of broadcast security awareness campaigns on a scale of ten. Frequency had a mean score of 7, simplicity of language 8, persuasiveness 6, richness of content 7 and time aired 5, again, the interview draws a closer similarity with the result of the questionnaire (see table III).

What this means therefore is for broadcast stations to ensure that audience are exposed to campaigns targeted at changing attitude while such programmes should be package in simple language too.

Conclusion

Nigeria prides itself as the giant of Africa, and if it must maintain that status, it must set positive examples for others to follow. The current situation does not in any way portray the country in good light before the international community; hence, everything humanly possible should be done to stop these wanton killings.

Recommendations

Base on the findings of this study, the paper makes the following recommendations:

1. The Federal Government of Nigeria should enact a law mandating broadcast media stations in Nigeria to give top priority on security awareness campaigns in their programming.
2. If possible, viewing and listening centres should be established especially in rural areas while efforts should be made to encourage the public to access such centres.
3. Broadcast media should make security awareness campaigns as frequent, persuasive and as simple as possible.
4. The Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ) and the National Broadcasting Commission (NBC) should form a synergy in ensuring that broadcast stations remain highly professional in carrying their campaigns on security related issues.

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